Sjur Usken

Views on new technologies and business opportunities from Sjur Usken

More automatic VoIP attacks – 10 000 hits in minutes…


Over 10 000 hits on one single VoIP honeypot within minutes. This is becoming the norm.

How they do it:

  1. They use SIPVicious to scan with SIP OPTIONS messages.
  2. If they get a response, this scan followed up with SIP REGISTER on all extensions from 100 to 9999
  3. Then they pick an EXTENSION and do brute force password on it. (another load of REGISTER)

What does this have to do to you?

If you have a VoIP platform which handles REGISTER or INVITES on a public IP, you BETTER have good passwords! And you need to handle large loads if have no protection!

If you can lock it down based on access lists or with VPN, do so now!

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Filter away those SIP attacks


Finally, an open-source solution to filter away those SIPVicious and other SIP attacks. SecSIP is Stateful SIP Protection Systemwhich analyses the SIP signalling on the fly and decides wether to forward it or not. It can throttle number of SIP messages (useful since one of mye VoIP honeypots was hit with 16 000 INVITES within 8 minutes..).

Great work and I’m looking forward to test it out live!
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Number of VoIP scannings has exploded


If you have an IP PBX on a public IP, and you are not quite sure if it is secure enough, you should get to it now!

Scannings on port 5060 has exploded the lastest days. Previously it was a couple hits in the week, now it’s up to a 100 a day. This means that if your VoIP setup is not 100% secure, others will find it and abuse it!And you will get the telephony bill!

Get to it, secure your VoIP communication platform right now!

Check the following:

  • All users has strong passwords
  • Access Lists are updated and preferably both ways (both incoming and outgoing traffic on the server)
  • No unused services are enabled
  • Latest patches are on the server OS
  • Latest patches are on the application
  • Latest SECURE firmware on the hardware endpoints (phones etc.)
  • Other services on the plattform like Web servers, TFTP, FTP, SSH are locked down or VERY strong passwords
  • Encrypt the traffic from the user and into the server (to make eavesdropping harder)
  • Make the PCs accessing your platform secure. Any keycatchers or sniffers installed here?
  • Forgotten someting? Please comment

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Why are there VoIP attacks from port 3058?


Been picking up more and more hits in the VoIP honeypots lately. What puzzles me, is that several of those originate from different IPs but same port number. IANA assigned port 3058 to the following:

videobeans 3058/tcp videobeans
videobeans 3058/udp videobeans

IPs that has hit one or more of our honeypots the latest days:

From port 3058
64.62.243.6
67.23.3.128
69.64.38.111

Other ports
174.129.70.133
207.239.216.52
207.239.216.53
208.38.164.48

Notice the two consecutive IPs, 207.239.216.52 and .53.

But why port 3058… the reason is probably simple, but for now I’m guessing on the same software running on PCs with a public IP.
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We demand the authority to free the free sprectrum!!


Inspired by this talk at Ecomm 2009 by Michael Calabrese. It’s time to let the intelligent wireless units utilize the available spectrum! Why allocate all the frequencies static, when you can divide them both in time, location, height (on ground, in planes..) and dynamically back-off channles in use.

If I had done the same spectrum scan in down-town Oslo, I would have found that the 900 and 1800 MHz channels for GSM and UMTS is utilized, while 2.4GHz is pretty crowded. There would also be some TV channels. But what about the rest??? Why not use it?

Demand a GPS in the senders, where they every 24 hours download what they are allowed to transmit and which frequencies. Just do something…. because the static allocation of frequencies are out of date and we need more (unlicensed) mobile bandwidth!

VoIP used for social engineering hacking


Direct VoIP attacks are escalating, but even as scary is using a hacked VoIP system to extend your social engineering in a firm. This can be done automatically by using hacked PBXes to make the call, to direct attacks towards a (larger) institution where you first hack their VoIP phone central, and then use real accounts on this system for social engineering.

More info about it from The Standard and the FTC “prank” about Vishing.

Take VoIP security more seriously!


I’m glad when people are taking VoIP security more seriously. VoIP will become an even more important service, integrated into everyday life on the Internet.

Ben in the Australian Honeynet Project is now on his third article about VoIP frauds. It is for the general audience and gives you a insight of what drives the hackers to get access to your VoIP system.

Lance Spitzner and I was interviewed for an article in the Norwegian Computerworld edition. Here I argued that it is not necessarily insecure systems with bugs, but rather configuration errors done by the administrators and installers.

Then it’s nice to see people making YuoTube videos of how to make your Asterisk more secure:

httpv://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tkHkWn8ZTXQ

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Article about the Honeynet Project


Computerworld in Norway published an article about The Honeynet Project and the Norwegian Honeynet Chapter. This is one of the main tools to learn the tools of how attackers abuse VoIP targets. Her is the Norwegian and English version.

Will SIP TLS be the solution to SIP Security?


SIP is now mostly run over UDP. This is scalable but unsecure. Microsoft uses only TCP and encrypted TLS. But TLS has its own flaws as shown by this webpage.

There are three general attacks against HTTPS discussed here, each with slightly different characteristics, all of which yield the same result: the attacker is able to execute an HTTP transaction of his choice, authenticated by a legitimate user (the victim of the MITM attack). Some attacks result in the attacker-supplied request generating a response document which is then presented to the client without any certificate warning or other indication to the user. Other techniques allow the attacker to forward or re-purpose client certificate authentication credentials.

They use HTTPS, but it could most likely also be done in SIP as well. When everybody is using SIP TLS, there will still be security issues….

More info in here.

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Another day, another (VoIP) fraud…


What the heck is the customers Asterisk calling Guatemala about quarter to five in the morning? 1000 calls to Guatemala, but very few actually went through or had any long duration. This was around 11 o’clock in the evening for Guatemala. What was the purpose of this abuse?

It would have been nice to have a tap into this unsecure Asterisk and listen in on the abuse calls. Was this open PBX sold as a gateway to a cash calling card company, or was it used to just free calling for the hacker itself? Ideas and comments are appreciated!

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